A380 - What went wrong list on QF32
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A380 - What went wrong list on QF32
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From: Perth, Western Australia
Respect indeed.
This made me smile though
Airline of choice, my ****.
This made me smile though
Philip of Perth Posted at 12:51 PM Today
Looks like the plane would have gone down if not for the very professional QANTAS crew. Looks like QANTAS will be airline of choice
So no other airline's pilot could have got that bird down? Airline of choice, my ****.
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From: Runway two seven right.
Well done to the crew, but that report, like most in the press, is cr@o.
For true professionalism, read this.
It's why I always try to fly BA.
On 11 May 2009, during a normal BA Boeing 747-400 departure from Johannesburg, with the First Officer as the handling pilot, the Number 3 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication appeared at 125 knots followed by the Number 2 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication at 160 knots. There was no deployment of thrust reverse and the 'In Transit' indication is not easily visible and was not seen by the crew who were concentrating on the take-off.
At this point the Group A sections of the leading edge flaps, which are a significant proportion of the leading edge high lift devices, retracted as they are designed to do when reverse thrust is selected on landing. Unaware of the changed leading edge configuration, the First Officer rotated the aircraft and the crew were immediately confronted with significant airframe buffet and the stick shaker activating. The crew had no idea why the aircraft had apparently entered a stall or pre-stall regime. As they were dealing with the emergency the Group A section of leading edge flaps started to re-deploy shortly after the aircraft became airborne.
The First Officer flew an attitude that prevented the aircraft stalling but also prevented contact with the ground despite being unable to read the instruments clearly due to the buffet. The Captain calmly supported the First officer by passing on critical information such as speed and aircraft height above the ground. He also raised the landing gear. The handling difficulties were initially made worse by the increase in drag created by the opening of the landing gear doors during the retraction process and the initial movements of the leading edge flaps as they started to redeploy. After the leading edge flaps had re-extended (taking 23 seconds) the aircraft performance returned to normal and the handling aspects of the event were over.
The crew still had to deal with an unknown set of circumstances. They decided to return to Johannesburg and planned for two, three and four engine approaches given the unknown nature of the fault. They also ensured that customers and the cabin crew were kept informed and remained calm and relaxed throughout.
Captain Michael Fairhurst and Senior First Officer James Brown displayed exemplary skill and professionalism while dealing with this emergency that occurred at a critical phase of flight. Both members of the flight crew played a significant role in recovering the aircraft safely from the very hazardous situation they were confronted with. Their actions undoubtedly saved the aircraft, and countless possible injuries or fatalities to those onboard, and they are accordingly awarded the Master’s Medal.
For true professionalism, read this.
It's why I always try to fly BA.
On 11 May 2009, during a normal BA Boeing 747-400 departure from Johannesburg, with the First Officer as the handling pilot, the Number 3 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication appeared at 125 knots followed by the Number 2 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication at 160 knots. There was no deployment of thrust reverse and the 'In Transit' indication is not easily visible and was not seen by the crew who were concentrating on the take-off.
At this point the Group A sections of the leading edge flaps, which are a significant proportion of the leading edge high lift devices, retracted as they are designed to do when reverse thrust is selected on landing. Unaware of the changed leading edge configuration, the First Officer rotated the aircraft and the crew were immediately confronted with significant airframe buffet and the stick shaker activating. The crew had no idea why the aircraft had apparently entered a stall or pre-stall regime. As they were dealing with the emergency the Group A section of leading edge flaps started to re-deploy shortly after the aircraft became airborne.
The First Officer flew an attitude that prevented the aircraft stalling but also prevented contact with the ground despite being unable to read the instruments clearly due to the buffet. The Captain calmly supported the First officer by passing on critical information such as speed and aircraft height above the ground. He also raised the landing gear. The handling difficulties were initially made worse by the increase in drag created by the opening of the landing gear doors during the retraction process and the initial movements of the leading edge flaps as they started to redeploy. After the leading edge flaps had re-extended (taking 23 seconds) the aircraft performance returned to normal and the handling aspects of the event were over.
The crew still had to deal with an unknown set of circumstances. They decided to return to Johannesburg and planned for two, three and four engine approaches given the unknown nature of the fault. They also ensured that customers and the cabin crew were kept informed and remained calm and relaxed throughout.
Captain Michael Fairhurst and Senior First Officer James Brown displayed exemplary skill and professionalism while dealing with this emergency that occurred at a critical phase of flight. Both members of the flight crew played a significant role in recovering the aircraft safely from the very hazardous situation they were confronted with. Their actions undoubtedly saved the aircraft, and countless possible injuries or fatalities to those onboard, and they are accordingly awarded the Master’s Medal.
Joined: Apr 2002
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From: The hell where youth and laughter go
Well done to the crew, but that report, like most in the press, is cr@p.
The flaps retracting seems a concerning issue - did they retract form hydraulic loss, or did the plane "think" otherwise due to wiring damage?
Well done to the crew, but that report, like most in the press, is cr@o.
For true professionalism, read this.
It's why I always try to fly BA.
On 11 May 2009, during a normal BA Boeing 747-400 departure from Johannesburg, with the First Officer as the handling pilot, the Number 3 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication appeared at 125 knots followed by the Number 2 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication at 160 knots. There was no deployment of thrust reverse and the 'In Transit' indication is not easily visible and was not seen by the crew who were concentrating on the take-off.
At this point the Group A sections of the leading edge flaps, which are a significant proportion of the leading edge high lift devices, retracted as they are designed to do when reverse thrust is selected on landing. Unaware of the changed leading edge configuration, the First Officer rotated the aircraft and the crew were immediately confronted with significant airframe buffet and the stick shaker activating. The crew had no idea why the aircraft had apparently entered a stall or pre-stall regime. As they were dealing with the emergency the Group A section of leading edge flaps started to re-deploy shortly after the aircraft became airborne.
The First Officer flew an attitude that prevented the aircraft stalling but also prevented contact with the ground despite being unable to read the instruments clearly due to the buffet. The Captain calmly supported the First officer by passing on critical information such as speed and aircraft height above the ground. He also raised the landing gear. The handling difficulties were initially made worse by the increase in drag created by the opening of the landing gear doors during the retraction process and the initial movements of the leading edge flaps as they started to redeploy. After the leading edge flaps had re-extended (taking 23 seconds) the aircraft performance returned to normal and the handling aspects of the event were over.
The crew still had to deal with an unknown set of circumstances. They decided to return to Johannesburg and planned for two, three and four engine approaches given the unknown nature of the fault. They also ensured that customers and the cabin crew were kept informed and remained calm and relaxed throughout.
Captain Michael Fairhurst and Senior First Officer James Brown displayed exemplary skill and professionalism while dealing with this emergency that occurred at a critical phase of flight. Both members of the flight crew played a significant role in recovering the aircraft safely from the very hazardous situation they were confronted with. Their actions undoubtedly saved the aircraft, and countless possible injuries or fatalities to those onboard, and they are accordingly awarded the Master’s Medal.
For true professionalism, read this.
It's why I always try to fly BA.
On 11 May 2009, during a normal BA Boeing 747-400 departure from Johannesburg, with the First Officer as the handling pilot, the Number 3 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication appeared at 125 knots followed by the Number 2 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication at 160 knots. There was no deployment of thrust reverse and the 'In Transit' indication is not easily visible and was not seen by the crew who were concentrating on the take-off.
At this point the Group A sections of the leading edge flaps, which are a significant proportion of the leading edge high lift devices, retracted as they are designed to do when reverse thrust is selected on landing. Unaware of the changed leading edge configuration, the First Officer rotated the aircraft and the crew were immediately confronted with significant airframe buffet and the stick shaker activating. The crew had no idea why the aircraft had apparently entered a stall or pre-stall regime. As they were dealing with the emergency the Group A section of leading edge flaps started to re-deploy shortly after the aircraft became airborne.
The First Officer flew an attitude that prevented the aircraft stalling but also prevented contact with the ground despite being unable to read the instruments clearly due to the buffet. The Captain calmly supported the First officer by passing on critical information such as speed and aircraft height above the ground. He also raised the landing gear. The handling difficulties were initially made worse by the increase in drag created by the opening of the landing gear doors during the retraction process and the initial movements of the leading edge flaps as they started to redeploy. After the leading edge flaps had re-extended (taking 23 seconds) the aircraft performance returned to normal and the handling aspects of the event were over.
The crew still had to deal with an unknown set of circumstances. They decided to return to Johannesburg and planned for two, three and four engine approaches given the unknown nature of the fault. They also ensured that customers and the cabin crew were kept informed and remained calm and relaxed throughout.
Captain Michael Fairhurst and Senior First Officer James Brown displayed exemplary skill and professionalism while dealing with this emergency that occurred at a critical phase of flight. Both members of the flight crew played a significant role in recovering the aircraft safely from the very hazardous situation they were confronted with. Their actions undoubtedly saved the aircraft, and countless possible injuries or fatalities to those onboard, and they are accordingly awarded the Master’s Medal.
I think its entirely for these situations that the pilots do not have ejection seats. If they did, and I was there, it would have been a case of 3..2..1...gone
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All these sorts of emergencies are practised in the simulator of course and a competent crew should be able to cope with them. This situation was obviously pretty bad, not surprising with the initial cause of the damage, broken off turbine discs are bad news believe me.
The crew deserve the kudos for handling the emergency competently and coping so well with all the troubles which accompanied the initial situation. Very easy to make a bad mistake under such conditions and they got it all right.
Les
The crew deserve the kudos for handling the emergency competently and coping so well with all the troubles which accompanied the initial situation. Very easy to make a bad mistake under such conditions and they got it all right.
Les
Trending Topics
"Qantas 'scarebus' QF32 was a flying wreck"
What kind of bollocks headline is this!?!?
Engine failures happen, fact of life.
If you have four engines, you are four times more likely to have an engine failure!
What kind of bollocks headline is this!?!?
Engine failures happen, fact of life.
If you have four engines, you are four times more likely to have an engine failure!
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If recall, the issuing of the airworthy certificate is based around the plane
meeting a number of key criteria, that could occur in the event of emergency.
One of which is that the landing gear must be able to deploy without any
mechanical or hydraulic assistance - ie under its own weight & gravity.
This was virtually a whole episode on the discovery making of series for the
plane. Needless to say the plane passed with flying colours, so the news
report highlighing that is irrelevant.
Mart
meeting a number of key criteria, that could occur in the event of emergency.
One of which is that the landing gear must be able to deploy without any
mechanical or hydraulic assistance - ie under its own weight & gravity.
This was virtually a whole episode on the discovery making of series for the
plane. Needless to say the plane passed with flying colours, so the news
report highlighing that is irrelevant.
Mart
If recall, the issuing of the airworthy certificate is based around the plane
meeting a number of key criteria, that could occur in the event of emergency.
One of which is that the landing gear must be able to deploy without any
mechanical or hydraulic assistance - ie under its own weight & gravity.
This was virtually a whole episode on the discovery making of series for the
plane. Needless to say the plane passed with flying colours, so the news
report highlighing that is irrelevant.
Mart
meeting a number of key criteria, that could occur in the event of emergency.
One of which is that the landing gear must be able to deploy without any
mechanical or hydraulic assistance - ie under its own weight & gravity.
This was virtually a whole episode on the discovery making of series for the
plane. Needless to say the plane passed with flying colours, so the news
report highlighing that is irrelevant.
Mart
Pontificating
Joined: May 2001
Posts: 11,574
Likes: 9
From: Conrod Straight
It's nothing like the British media imo, the 6 o'clock news here is very professional and stern compared to their sunny disposition, believe me when I came back I found watching British news programmes very depressing in contrast.
Last edited by Funkii Munkii; Nov 12, 2010 at 09:06 PM.
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Joined: Aug 2000
Posts: 9,368
Likes: 0
Well done to the crew, but that report, like most in the press, is cr@o.
For true professionalism, read this.
It's why I always try to fly BA.
On 11 May 2009, during a normal BA Boeing 747-400 departure from Johannesburg, with the First Officer as the handling pilot, the Number 3 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication appeared at 125 knots followed by the Number 2 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication at 160 knots. There was no deployment of thrust reverse and the 'In Transit' indication is not easily visible and was not seen by the crew who were concentrating on the take-off.
At this point the Group A sections of the leading edge flaps, which are a significant proportion of the leading edge high lift devices, retracted as they are designed to do when reverse thrust is selected on landing. Unaware of the changed leading edge configuration, the First Officer rotated the aircraft and the crew were immediately confronted with significant airframe buffet and the stick shaker activating. The crew had no idea why the aircraft had apparently entered a stall or pre-stall regime. As they were dealing with the emergency the Group A section of leading edge flaps started to re-deploy shortly after the aircraft became airborne.
The First Officer flew an attitude that prevented the aircraft stalling but also prevented contact with the ground despite being unable to read the instruments clearly due to the buffet. The Captain calmly supported the First officer by passing on critical information such as speed and aircraft height above the ground. He also raised the landing gear. The handling difficulties were initially made worse by the increase in drag created by the opening of the landing gear doors during the retraction process and the initial movements of the leading edge flaps as they started to redeploy. After the leading edge flaps had re-extended (taking 23 seconds) the aircraft performance returned to normal and the handling aspects of the event were over.
The crew still had to deal with an unknown set of circumstances. They decided to return to Johannesburg and planned for two, three and four engine approaches given the unknown nature of the fault. They also ensured that customers and the cabin crew were kept informed and remained calm and relaxed throughout.
Captain Michael Fairhurst and Senior First Officer James Brown displayed exemplary skill and professionalism while dealing with this emergency that occurred at a critical phase of flight. Both members of the flight crew played a significant role in recovering the aircraft safely from the very hazardous situation they were confronted with. Their actions undoubtedly saved the aircraft, and countless possible injuries or fatalities to those onboard, and they are accordingly awarded the Master’s Medal.
For true professionalism, read this.
It's why I always try to fly BA.
On 11 May 2009, during a normal BA Boeing 747-400 departure from Johannesburg, with the First Officer as the handling pilot, the Number 3 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication appeared at 125 knots followed by the Number 2 engine Thrust Reverser 'In Transit' indication at 160 knots. There was no deployment of thrust reverse and the 'In Transit' indication is not easily visible and was not seen by the crew who were concentrating on the take-off.
At this point the Group A sections of the leading edge flaps, which are a significant proportion of the leading edge high lift devices, retracted as they are designed to do when reverse thrust is selected on landing. Unaware of the changed leading edge configuration, the First Officer rotated the aircraft and the crew were immediately confronted with significant airframe buffet and the stick shaker activating. The crew had no idea why the aircraft had apparently entered a stall or pre-stall regime. As they were dealing with the emergency the Group A section of leading edge flaps started to re-deploy shortly after the aircraft became airborne.
The First Officer flew an attitude that prevented the aircraft stalling but also prevented contact with the ground despite being unable to read the instruments clearly due to the buffet. The Captain calmly supported the First officer by passing on critical information such as speed and aircraft height above the ground. He also raised the landing gear. The handling difficulties were initially made worse by the increase in drag created by the opening of the landing gear doors during the retraction process and the initial movements of the leading edge flaps as they started to redeploy. After the leading edge flaps had re-extended (taking 23 seconds) the aircraft performance returned to normal and the handling aspects of the event were over.
The crew still had to deal with an unknown set of circumstances. They decided to return to Johannesburg and planned for two, three and four engine approaches given the unknown nature of the fault. They also ensured that customers and the cabin crew were kept informed and remained calm and relaxed throughout.
Captain Michael Fairhurst and Senior First Officer James Brown displayed exemplary skill and professionalism while dealing with this emergency that occurred at a critical phase of flight. Both members of the flight crew played a significant role in recovering the aircraft safely from the very hazardous situation they were confronted with. Their actions undoubtedly saved the aircraft, and countless possible injuries or fatalities to those onboard, and they are accordingly awarded the Master’s Medal.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Airways_Flight_9
In particular, the announcement the captain made to the passengers, whilst trying to restart all 4 engines!!!
Ladies and gentlemen, this is your captain speaking. We have a small problem. All four engines have stopped. We are doing our damnedest to get them under control. I trust you are not in too much distress
a bit like negotiating one's way up a badger's ****
astraboy.
Last edited by astraboy; Nov 12, 2010 at 10:04 PM.
A typical Aussie journo headline, they dont take themselves too seriously and it's reflected in their media
It's nothing like the British media imo, the 6 o'clock news here is very professional and stern compared to their sunny disposition, believe me when I came back I found watching British news programmes very depressing in contrast.
It's nothing like the British media imo, the 6 o'clock news here is very professional and stern compared to their sunny disposition, believe me when I came back I found watching British news programmes very depressing in contrast.
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